

Intentionality An Essay In The Philosophy Of Mind

A direct successor to Searle's Speech Acts (C.U.P. 1969), Expression and Meaning refines earlier analyses and extends speech-act theory to new areas including indirect and figurative discourse, metaphor and fiction.

In the blink of an eye, I can redirect my thought from London to Austin, from apples to unicorns, from former president Obama to the mythical flying horse, Pegasus. How is this possible? How can we think about things that do not exist, like unicorns and Pegasus? They are not there to be thought about, yet we think about them just as easily as we think about things that do exist. Thinking About Things addresses these and related questions, taking as its framework a representational theory of mind. It explains how mental states are attributed, what their aboutness consists in, whether or not they are relational, and whether any of them involve nonexistent things. The explanation centers on a new theory of what is involved in attributing attitudes like thinking, hoping, and wanting. These attributions are intentional: some of them seem to involve nonexistent things, and they typically have semantic and logical peculiarities, like the fact that one cannot always substitute one expression for another that refers to the same thing without affecting truth. Mark Sainsburys new theory, display theory, explains these anomalies. For example, substituting coreferring expressions does not always preserve truth because the correctness of an attribution depends on what concepts it displays, not on what the concepts refer to. And a concept that refers to nothing may be used in an accurate display of what someone is thinking.

'This small but tightly packed volume is easily the most substantial discussion of speech acts since John Austin's How To Do Things With Words and one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language in recent decades.'--Philosophical Quarterly Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness -- the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program.

An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology
Force, Meaning and Mind
Noema and Thinkability
Thinking about Things
An Analytic Reconstruction
John Searle's Philosophy of Language
Aspects of Psychologism

A work in the history of systematic philosophy that is itself animated by a systematic philosophic aspiration, this book by one of the most prominent American philosophers working today provides an entirely new way of looking at the development of philosophy from Descartes to the present. Brandom begins by setting out a historical context and outlining a methodological rationale for his enterprise. Then, in chapters on Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Frege, Heidegger, and Sellars, he pursues philosophical issues concerning intentionality, and therefore mindedness itself, revealing an otherwise invisible set of overlapping themes and explanatory strategies. Various functionalist, inferentialist, holist, normative, and social pragmatic explanations of intentionality offered by these philosophers, taken together, form a distinctive tradition. The fresh perspective afforded by this tradition enriches our understanding of the philosophical topics being addressed, provides a new way for viewing our philosophical ancestors, and highlights central features of the sort of rationality that consists in discerning a philosophical tradition--and it does so by elaborating a novel, concrete instance of just such an enterprise.

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of its role in intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy. Reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Dorothea Frede suggests that the 'embarrassment' for Aquinas; to the contrary, the analysis offered in this book argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas's philosophy of mind would be an embarrassment. By means of this faculty of inner sense, Aquinas offers an awareness of individuals of natural kinds--referred to by Aquinas as incidental objects of sense--which comprise the principal ontological categories in Aquinas's metaphysics. By using this awareness of individuals of a natural kind, Aquinas explains the process of abstraction using the active intellect (intellectus agens). Were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.

Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as well as versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. The we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority. Thus, for instance, cooperation and attitude formation are studied in cases where the participants are governed "from above" as in many corporations. The volume goes on to provide a philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) depends on group-based collective intentionality. We-mode collective intentionality is reducible and is needed to complement individualistic accounts in social scientific theorizing. The we-mode approach is used in the book to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, and social practices and in particular solidarity. Tuomela establishes the first complete theory of group reasons (in the sense of members' reasons for participation in group activities). The book argues in terms of game-theoretical group-reasoning that the kind of weak collective intentionality approach involves is both conceptually and rational-functionally different from what an individualistic approach ("pro-group I-mode" approach) entails.

The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence: intelligibility; analog and digital systems and supervenience; presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation; the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood.

Thought and Object
The First Person
Social Ontology
The Construction of Social Reality
Having Thought
Intentionality, Analysis, and Naturalism
Intentionality

What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It holds by the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects--this holistic individualism--it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow any of a number of paths: space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction, for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments.

Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.

This short treatise looks at how we construct a social reality from our sense impressions; at how, for example, we construct a 'five-pound note' with all that implies in terms of value and social meaning, from the printed piece of paper we see and touch. In The Construction of Social Reality, eminent philosopher John Searle examines the structure of social reality (or those portions of the world that are facts only by human agreement, such as money, marriage, property, and government), and contrasts it to a brute reality that is independent of human agreement. Searle shows that brute reality provides the indisputable foundation for all social reality, and that social reality, while very real, is maintained by nothing more than custom and habit.

These interviews with John Searle arguably today's most influential living analytic philosopher cover a wide scope. Among the topics discussed are: the Philosophy of Language, the Theory of Mind, and the nature of the social world. With a transparent and precise style, Prof. Searle reconstructs the different stages in the development of Speech Acts Theory. He also sums up twenty years of debate about the Chinese Room Argument, which he uses to challenge those Artificial Intelligence scholars who claim that the brain is a digital computer. As Searle himself points out, some of the hypotheses eloquently posited during the conversation about fields like as aesthetics, political theory, and modal logic are not published elsewhere. In easy-to-read, colloquial question-and-answer style, this volume includes many fascinating personal and historical details about Searle's years at Oxford, his commitment with the Free Speech Movement, his forty years of experience as a professor at Berkeley, and his intellectual exchanges with scholars such as John Austin, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. Prof. John Searle is Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California (Berkeley, California, USA). He is the author of Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), Minds, Brains and Science (1984), The Construction of Social Reality (1995), among many other books and articles. Gustavo Faigenbaum graduated from the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and obtained his Ph. D. in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, New York, USA. He is Professor at the University of Palermo (Buenos Aires, Argentina) and researcher at the National Council for Scientific Research (CONICET Argentina).

An Essay on Reference and Intentionality
The Refutation of Internalism
Phenomenal Intentionality
Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses
Mind, Language And Society
Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind
Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology

For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has addressed an astonishing range of issues in the fields of phenomenology, existentialism, cognitive science, and the philosophical study of mind. Dreyfus has inspired a whole generation of philosophers as he has creatively drawn on and clearly articulated the seminal works of thinkers like Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. This volume presents a selection of Dreyfus's most influential essays on mind and action. The book begins with a model of skillful engaged human action, which informs much of Dreyfus's philosophy, and was developed in collaboration with Stuart Dreyfus. The volume then presents articles developing a critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science. Dreyfus argues that representational models of mind offer an impoverished and distorting account of human engagement with the world. The chapters show this by addressing issues in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences through the skill model.

This book has roots in our respective doctoral dissertations, both completed in 1970 at Stanford under the tutelage of Professors Dagfinn Føllesdal, John D. Goheen, and Jaakko Hintikka. In the fall of 1970 we wrote a joint article that proved to be a prolegomenon to the present work, our 'Intentionality via Intentions', The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). Professor Hintikka then suggested we write a joint book, and in the spring of 1971 we began writing the present work. The project was to last ten years as our conception of the project continued to grow at each stage. Our intellectual debts follow the history of our project. During our dissertation days at Stanford, we joined with fellow doctoral candidates John Lad and Michael Sukale and Professors Føllesdal, Goheen, and Hintikka in an informal seminar on phenomenology that met weekly from June of 1969 through March of 1970. During the summers of 1973 and 1974 we regrouped in another informal seminar on phenomenology, meeting weekly at Stanford and sometimes Berkeley, the regular participants being ourselves, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Jane Lipsky McIntyre, Izchak Miller, and, in 1974, John Haugeland.

Disillusionment with psychology is leading more and more people to formal philosophy for clues about how to think about life. But most of us who try to grapple with concepts such as reality, truth, common sense, consciousness, and society lack the rigorous training to discuss them with any confidence. John Searle brings these notions down from their abstract heights to the terra firma of real-world understanding, so that those with no knowledge of philosophy can understand how these principles play out in our everyday lives. The author stresses that there is a real world out there to deal with, and condemns the belief that the reality of our world is dependent on our perception of it.

This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning scepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of 'what is said' in relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work in the philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area.

Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
Husserl and Intentionality
The Common Mind
Elements of Mind
Motion, Evolution and Content
An Essay in Human Intentionalities
New Essays

"The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." One of the world's most eminent thinkers, Searle dismantles these theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. He begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as materialism, consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The book offers a refreshingly direct and engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy.

'... an immensely well-informed an up-to-date discussion... Replete with controversial and original insights, it is sure to stimulate the interest of students and specialists alike.' THES This book provides an accessible lively introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Tim Crane proposes an original and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind, and, in the light of his theory, examines the central problems of the philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality, the problem of consciousness, and the problem of perception.

Ten original essays examine the central themes of John Searle's ontology of society. Written by an international team of philosophers and social scientists, the essays contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work. Moreover, these essays open the door to new approaches to addressing fundamental questions about social phenomena. This book also features a new essay by Searle himself that summarizes and further develops his work.

Intentionality
An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Cambridge University Press
Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts
Tales of the Mighty Dead
From Individual to Collective Intentionality
Expression and Meaning
Phenomenal Character, Intentionality, and Empathy
The Mystery of Consciousness

Edmund Husserl: The nexus of phenomena : intentionality, perception, and temporality

This collection makes available, in one place, the very best essays on the founding father of phenomenology, reprinting key writings on Husserl's thought from the past seventy years. It draws together a range of writings, many otherwise inaccessible, that have been recognized as seminal contributions not only to an understanding of this great philosopher but also to the development of his phenomenology. The four volumes are arranged as follows: Volume I Classic essays from Husserl's assistants, students and earlier interlocutors. Including a selection of papers from such figures as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur and Levinas. Volume II Classic commentaries on Husserl's published works. "Covering the Logical Investigations," " Ideas I, " " Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness," "" ""and" Formal and Transcendental Logic." Volumes III and IV Papers concentrating on particular aspects of Husserl's theory including: Husserl's account of mathematics and logic, his theory of science, the nature of phenomenological reduction, his account of perception and language, the theory of space and time, his phenomenology of imagination and empathy, the concept of the life-world and his epistemology.

It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer programs. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which avenues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examination of how conscious states are caused by the brain. Only when we understand how the brain works will we solve the mystery of consciousness, and only then will we begin to understand issues ranging from artificial intelligence to our very nature as human beings.

Publisher Description
Intentionality is the mind's ability to be "of," "about," or "directed" at things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might "say" that grass is green or that Santa Claus is jolly, and a visual experience might be "of" a blue cup. While the existence of the phenomenon of intentionality is manifestly obvious, how exactly the mind gets to be "directed" at things, which may not even exist, is deeply mysterious and controversial. It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms of tracking relations, information, functional roles, and similar notions. This book breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According to the theory advanced by Mendelovici, the phenomenal intentionality theory, there is a central kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and any other kind of intentionality derives from it. The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts, broad and object-involving contents, and nonconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a radically internalistic picture of the mind, on which all phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly singled out by us.

Knowledge and Intentionality
Conversations with John Searle
Context and Content
Essays on Intentionality

Social Phenomenology

An Essay on Metaphilosophy and Mind

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

This volume features a critical evaluation of the recent work of the philosopher, Prof. Raimo Tuomela and it also offers it offers new approaches to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate. It specifically looks at Tuomela's book Social Ontology and its accounts of collective intentionality and related topics. The book contains eight essays written by expert contributors that present different perspectives on Tuomela ' s investigation into the philosophy of sociality, social ontology, theory of action, and (philosophical) decision and game theory. In addition, Tuomela himself gives a comprehensive response to each essay and defends his theory in terms of the new arguments presented here. Overall, readers will gain a deeper insight into group reasoning and the "we-mode" approach, which is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices, and institutions as well as group solidarity. This book will be of interest to a wide range of readers and graduate students and researchers interested in contemporary philosophy of sociality, sociological theory, social ontology as well as the philosophy of mind, decision and game theory, and cognitive science. Tuomela ' s book stands as a model of excellence in social ontology, an especially intractable field of philosophical inquiry that benefits conspicuously from the devotion of Tuomela ' s keen philosophical mind. His book is must reading in social ontology. J. Angelo Corlett, Julia Lyons Strobel

The years of study on Husserl ' s theory of intentionality have led to a number of non-equivalent interpretations. The present work attempts to investigate the most prominent of these by presenting both their advantages and difficulties. However, its key point is specifically the analysis of Husserl ' s theory. This is made in several stages that are concerned with the relation between noesis and noema: whether it is one-to-one or many-to-one, the kind of transcendence and dependency between them, and whether noema supervenes on noesis. Moreover, Husserl ' s theory is also examined in—usually ignored—instances of contradiction, nonsense and intentional conflict. The outcome is a fresh reading in which noema occurs as the possibly thinkable content capable of constituting multi-objective references and composed of pure X explained in terms of syntactic matter and form.

Acting together requires collective intentions. The contributions to this volume seek to critically assess or to enrich theories of collective intentionality by exploring topics such as collective belief, mutual coordination, and the explanation of group behavior.

This book contains eleven original papers about intentionality. Some explore current problems such as the status of intentional content, the intentionality of perception and emotion, the connections between intentionality and normativity, the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, the characteristics of the intentional idiom. Others discuss the work of historical figures like Locke, Brentano, Husserl and Frege.

An Essay on Intentionality

Philosophy In The Real World

Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality

An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics

Aquinas's Theory of Perception

Essays Toward an Understanding of Mind

In Context and Content Robert Stalnaker develops a philosophical picture of the nature of speech and thought and the relations between them. Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is used to express thought, and the role of the external environment in determining the contents of our thoughts. Stalnaker argues against the widespread assumption of the priority of linguistic over mental representation, which he suggests has had a distorting influence on our understanding. The first part of the book develops a framework for representing contexts and the way they interact with the interpretation of what is said in them. This framework is used to help to explain a range of linguistic phenomena concerning presupposition and assertion, conditional statements, the attribution of beliefs, and the use of names, descriptions, and pronouns to refer. Stalnaker then draws out the conception of thought and its content that is implicit in this framework. He defends externalism about thought—the assumption that our thoughts have the contents they have in virtue of the way we are situated in the world—and explores the role of linguistic action and linguistic structure in determining the contents of our thoughts. Context and Content offers philosophers and cognitive scientists a summation of Stalnaker's important and influential work in this area. His new introduction to the volume gives an overview of this work and offers a convenient way in for those who are new to it. The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a new forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines—cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory—join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book constitutes an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines.

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Social Phenomenology offers an account of collective intentionality informed by the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. The account argues that if consciousness and intentionality are only intrinsic to individuals, denying collectivism, that it does not follow that one endorses an atomistic conception of the subject.

Intentionality provides the philosophical foundations for Searle's earlier works, Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning.

A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language

An Essay in the Philosophy of Language

Skillful Coping

An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality

Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought

Essays on the phenomenology of everyday perception and action

The dissertation is a compilation of three papers in the philosophy of mind. The common theme running through the dissertation concerns the relationship between two components of the mind that, during the 20th-century, were normally kept distinct---the phenomenal, and the intentional. It was a common assumption during this time that one could give a proper account of intentionality without having to account for, or discuss, phenomenality. And similarly for giving an account of the phenomenal. Recently, however, there has been interest in the idea that phenomenality and intentionality are intimately related, and so these earlier assumptions may have been misguided. Roughly, the proposed relation between phenomenality and intentionality is this: What an intentional state is about, i.e., its intentionality, is grounded in phenomenal, or qualitative, aspects of experience. This is the notion of phenomenal intentionality. In Chapter 1 I develop an account of this kind, and argue that phenomenality is the source of intentionality. Because my main test cases in this chapter are sensory, more needs to be said about how my account applies to non-sensory intentional states. In Chapter 2 I seek to expand the scope of my account by arguing that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. This is the thesis that cognitive episodes, and their contents, have a proprietary phenomenal character, one not based in sense experience. By establishing this thesis I show that phenomenality grounds the intentionality of at least one kind of non-sensory state. Thus, in two central intentional domains, phenomenality plays a crucial role in grounding intentionality. Finally, in Chapter 3, I develop an account of empathy---the phenomenon by which we understand others---and apply the results of the previous two chapters to this account. The account of empathy I develop holds that empathy is a species of intentionality. What makes an experience one of empathy is that the formal intentional structure is modified in certain ways. As I show, phenomenality is an essential part of this experience. Thus, we have reason to think that phenomenality plays an important role in how we understand others.

Mind

Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

A Brief Introduction

Past and Future

Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality

Consciousness and Language

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality