

## Lifting Economic Sanctions On Iran World Bank

Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Tehran's construction of gas centrifuges and uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. This book discusses Tehran's compliance with international obligations. It also examines the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program; the economic sanctions and the authority to lift restrictions on Iran; and the Iran sanctions.

"Based on first-hand reporting from Syria and Washington, journalist Reese Erlich unravels the complex dynamics underlying the Syrian civil war. Through vivid, on-the-ground accounts and interviews with both rebel leaders and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Erlich gives the reader a better understanding of this momentous power struggle and why it matters. Through his many contacts inside Syria, the author reveals who is supporting Assad and why; he describes the agendas of the rebel factions; and he depicts in stark terms the dire plight of many ordinary Syrian people caught in the cross-fire. The book also provides insights into the role of the Kurds, the continuing influence of Iran, and the policies of American leaders who seem interested only in protecting US regional interests. Disturbing and enlightening at once, this timely book shows you not only what is happening inside Syria but why it is so important for the Middle East, the US, and the world. The partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China presents a unique challenge to U.S. interests and objectives, including dissuading Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. This paper examines factors driving Chinese-Iranian cooperation, potential tensions in the Chinese-Iranian partnership, and U.S. policy options for influencing this partnership to meet U.S. objectives.

This 2015 Article IV Consultation highlights that economic activity in Iran has slowed down significantly since the fourth quarter of 2014, owing to sharp decline in global oil prices, tight corporate and bank balance sheets, and postponed consumption and investment decisions ahead of the expected lifting of economic sanctions. Twelve-month (point-to-point) inflation has declined to about 10 percent in recent months, largely reflecting lower food and beverage inflation, and the inflation rate is expected to remain close to 14 percent by year-end. Prospects for 2016/17 are brighter, owing to the prospective lifting of economic sanctions.

The Strategic Impact of Iran's Rising Petroleum Exports After Sanctions

U. S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions

The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect

The Economic Weapon

Iran Nuclear Agreement and U. S. Exit

Economic Welfare and Inequality in Iran

This timely book explains how recognition and misrecognition have the power to fuel conflict and to initiate reconciliation. Constance Duncombe presents a detailed conceptual and empirical investigation of one of the most significant flashpoints in global politics: the fraught bilateral relations between the US and Iran. Duncombe uses this relationship to explore the importance of representation in shaping the identity of a state, as well as how it is recognised by others on the world stage. In 2015, Iran and the US reached an agreement on the framework for a long-term deal that allows Iran limited nuclear technological capacity in exchange for the lifting of debilitating economic sanctions. In light of decades of animosity between Iran and the US, which

previously thwarted attempts on both sides to reach an amicable agreement, this book asks how we can best explain the initial success of this deal given the Trump administration's 2018 US withdrawal from the agreement.

The July 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1), with the attendant lifting of sanctions on Iran, will have significant consequences for the global, regional and national economies. First, Iran's return to the oil market, coupled with increased production from Libya (should the conflict subside) will keep world oil prices low. Secondly, once sanctions and restrictions on financial transactions are relaxed, Iran's trade, which had both declined in absolute terms and shifted away from Europe towards Asia and the Middle East, is likely to pick up. Thirdly, the Iranian economy, which has been in recession for the past two years, will receive a major boost from increased oil revenues--conservatively estimated at about \$15 billion in the first year--and lower trade costs. This issue of the MENA Quarterly Economic Brief (QEB) traces these effects on the world oil market, on Iran's trading partners, and on the Iranian economy.

The United States has led the international community in imposing economic sanctions on Iran, in an effort to change the government of that country's support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and development of a nuclear program.

On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 11, "ceasing U.S. participation in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and taking additional action to counter Iran's malign influence and deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon." The action sets in motion a reestablishment of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions that will affect U.S. businesses and include secondary sanctions that target the commerce originating in other countries that engage in trade with and investment in Iran. Prior to this juncture, the United States had led the international community in imposing economic sanctions on Iran in an effort to change the government of that country's support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and development of a nuclear program. The United States' abrogation of its participation in the JCPOA, at least in the near-term, sets the United States apart from its allies and partners in what has been for more than a decade a unified, multilateral approach to Iran's malign activities. This report identifies the basis in U.S. law for sanctions imposed on Iran, and the nature of the authority to waive or lift those restrictions. It comprises four tables that present legislation and executive orders that are specific to Iran and its objectionable activities in the areas of terrorism, human rights, and weapons proliferation. It will be updated if and when new legislation is enacted, or, in the case of executive orders, if and when the President takes additional steps to change U.S. policy toward Iran. On July 14, 2015, the United States, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, European Union, and Iran agreed to a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to "ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful...." In turn, the negotiating parties and United Nations would "produce the comprehensive lifting of all U.N. Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy." On January 16, 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had implemented the measures enumerated in the JCPOA to disable and end its nuclear-related capabilities. Secretary of State Kerry confirmed the arrival of Implementation Day (defined in Annex V of the JCPOA). President Obama, the State Department, and the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control initiated steps for the United States to meet its obligations under the JCPOA (Annexes II and V)-revoking a number of executive orders, delisting individuals and entities designated as Specially Designated Nationals, issuing general licenses to authorize the resumption of some trade, and exercising waivers for non-U.S. persons as allowable by various laws. President Trump's May 8 announcement indicates that the United States will, over the next three to six months, reconstruct the U.S. sanctions regime.

Losing an Enemy

Economic Sanctions Reconsidered

After the Sanctions

Preferable to War But No Silver Bullet

Economic Implications of Lifting Sanctions on Iran

The Initial Report of Project Pistachio Harvest

Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. This book discusses Tehran's compliance with international obligations. It also examines the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program; the economic sanctions and the authority to lift restrictions in Iran; and the Iran sanctions.

The issue of Iran's access to the financial system is now proving to be a critical component of the overall health of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was formally implemented on 16 January 2016. The JCPOA requires Iran to restrain its nuclear programme and increase international oversight of it, in return for the lifting of UN, EU and US sanctions that had been put in place over the nuclear issue. Almost a year after it came into effect, not all the aspects of the agreement (and the non-proliferation objective it serves) are fully operational. These dynamics have wider repercussions, including on the global discussion over counter-proliferation finance (CPF) initiatives. A review of the relationship between the JCPOA and this CPF agenda is both timely and necessary. This paper considers how financial institutions have approached the lifting of specified Iran sanctions, and what this means for efforts to counter proliferation finance. It highlights that financial institutions of different sizes and with varying global reach have approached re-engagement with Iran in different ways, mostly as a result of their continued sensitivities to remaining US sanctions. This paper also identifies a concerning trend: with the majority of UN and EU sanctions against Iran now gone, as well as US secondary sanctions affecting non-US companies doing business with Iran, it is becoming more difficult to mobilise and direct a concerted global effort to counter proliferation financing. This challenge must be borne in mind as

states seek to revive an international discussion over the future of CPF initiatives. Contents: (1) Background of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA): Key Provisions: Triggers and Available Sanctions; Waiver and Termination Authority; Iran Freedom Support Act Amendments; Effectiveness and Ongoing Challenges: Energy Routes and Refinery Investment: Refinery Construction; Significant Purchase Agreements; Efforts in the 110th and 111th Congress to Expand ISA Application; Other Energy-Related Sanctions Ideas; (2) Relationships to Other U.S. Sanctions: Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment With Iran; Treasury Department Targeted Financial Measures; Terrorism-Related Sanctions; Executive Order 13224; Proliferation-Related Sanctions; Efforts to Promote Divestment; Blocked Iranian Property and Assets. Tables.

This book examines economic inequality and social disparity in Iran, together with their drivers, over the past four decades. During this period, income distribution and economic welfare were affected by the 1979 Revolution, the eight-year war with Iraq, post-war privatization and economic liberalization initiatives carried out under the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations, the ascendance of a populist economic platform under the Ahmadinejad administration, and the lifting of energy and financial sanctions under the Rouhani administration. Featuring a mix of scholars, including Iranian academics who experienced these changes and are publishing in English for the first time, this collection offers quantitative and descriptive studies of the country's post-revolutionary economic development and disparities. In most chapters, a hypothesis is developed from existing theories or observations, which is then tested using available data. This unique combination of new voices, academic as well as personal experiences, and scientific methods will be a valuable addition to the library of the scholars of modern Iran's economy and society.

Developments since the Revolution

Unthinkable

Travel and Tourism - Iran

Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy

World Economic Outlook, October 2015

### **From Confrontation to Accord**

**This volume contains a review of evidence to assess whether sanctions work, to assess what determines their success and to assess why their effectiveness has declined. It looks at the uses of economic sanctions since 1914 and evaluates the effectiveness of sanctions as a policy tool. It contains 11 case studies of different countries which each include a chronology; the sanctioning country's objectives; the target country's response; the roles played by important third countries; relevant economic data and a calculation of costs; and an assessment of the outcome.**

**A foremost expert on Middle Eastern relations examines Iran's current nuclear potential while charting America's future course of action, recounting the prolonged clash between both nations to outline options for American policymakers. By the author of The Persian Puzzle.**

**Iran U. S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions Createspace Independent Publishing Platform**  
**Iran is rejoining the global economy -- and on its way to becoming a project hot spot. With the lifting of international economic sanctions this year following a landmark nuclear agreement, a project bonanza across a wide swath of industries is emerging to meet the country's pent-up demand. The nuclear deal gives Iran access to foreign investment -- which means organizations around the world are eyeing opportunities to help finance and execute major projects.**

**Balancing Proliferation Finance Risk and Economic Opportunity**

**Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest**

**China and Iran**

**As Sanctions on the Country Lift, Hoteliers are Launching Projects to Accommodate More Tourists**

**Economic, Political, and Military Relations**

**Iran**

***This issue discusses a number of factors affecting global growth, as well as growth prospects across the world's main countries and regions. It assesses the ongoing recovery from the global financial crisis in advanced and emerging market economies and evaluates risks, both upside and downside, including those associated with commodity prices, currency fluctuations, and financial market volatility. A special feature examines in detail causes and implications of the recent commodity price downturn; analytical chapters look at the effects of commodity windfalls on potential output and of exchange rate movements on trade.***

***"The decades since the first major oil embargo in 1973 have shown all too clearly that no one can predict oil and gas prices and petroleum export revenues. This is particularly true when oil supply is so high, key exporters like Iraq and Libya are at war, production is partly driven by the tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors, new***

***sources of production are coming on line, and the world seems be headed for a China-driven collapse in the growth of petroleum demand. There are important new estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, that indicate that Iran is not going to see the kind of windfall from the lifting of sanctions as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions that some expected at the time the agreement was signed. Iran's petroleum exports will increase, but they will do so at a time when oil and gas prices are far lower than at the time when sanctions became truly effective, and when they are far lower than most experts predicted at the time the JCPOA was negotiated and signed. Many of the estimates of Iran's gains also assume that Iran will make major internal economic reforms -- reforms for which many in Iran's regime have long recognized the need, but have been unable to actually make. This is a critical issue because most estimates of the gains Iran will get from lifting sanctions are more dependent on the ability to use higher petroleum revenues to catalyze the overall growth of the Iranian economy than on the increase in export ... The rising level of tension and violence in the region, as well as external factors, adds to this level of uncertainty. Iran's rising rivalry with Saudi Arabia is occurring at time when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has proven to be extremely weak, and Saudi Arabia has little incentive to cut back on production unless other states like Iran and Russia do so, and the net impact is a serious rise in Saudi Arabia's real export revenues. At the same time, the slow down in China's economic growth and demand for all commodities -- including petroleum -- now seems likely to last for at least several years, driven in part by rising Chinese costs and the lack of economic growth and demand for imports by other states"--Publisher's web site.***

***With economic sanctions set to lift in 2016, Iran wants to become an international tourist destination. And hoteliers are stepping up with projects to meet a growing number of visitors to the long-isolated country. Iran cracked open its doors to international tourists in 2013, but sanctions still made it difficult for tourists to use credit cards. This year's international agreement between Iran and Western nations to limit the country's nuclear program and end the sanctions will make life easier for travelers.***

***On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that had negotiated with Tehran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany-collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA required constraints that seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. The agreement replaced the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim nuclear accord in effect from 2014 to 2016. Congress did not enact a resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA by the deadline of September 17, 2015, which was set by the Iran Nuclear Agreement***

**Review Act (P.L. 114-17); the JCPOA formally took effect on "Adoption Day" (October 18, 2015). "Implementation Day" was declared by the P5+1 on January 16, 2016, representing the completion of Iran's nuclear requirements; entry into effect of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA; and the start of sanctions relief stipulated in the agreement. Officials from both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations have certified that Iran has abided by its JCPOA commitments. The Obama Administration and other P5+1 leaders asserted that the JCPOA is the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon are available indefinitely. The agreement contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violates its commitments. Top Trump Administration officials have argued that the JCPOA does not adequately serve U.S. interests because the extensive sanctions relief provided under the accord gives Iran additional resources to conduct "malign activities" in the region, and does not restrict Iran's development of ballistic missiles. Resolution 2231, which was adopted in July 2015, prohibits arms transfers to or from Iran, but only for five years, and contains a voluntary restriction on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles for only up to eight years. On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran-Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany-opposed the U.S. decision and have been meeting with Iranian officials to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has pledged to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement.**

**Iran's Hotel Boom**

**Islamic Republic of Iran**

**The Iranian Deception**

**Lifting Economic Sanctions on Iran**

**Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law**

**The Case of the Swiss Machine Industry in Iran**

*Research Paper (postgraduate) from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, , language: English, abstract: In this report, our objective is to draw a simplified image of Iran's true business environment, competition landscape, and economic potentials. We will look at the country's current market conditions and entry barriers, and explain how foreign investors can increase their chance of establishing successful businesses in the country by developing a comprehensive strategic plan. Iran has the potential of becoming one of the hottest investment destinations in the next 20 years. This will greatly depend on whether the*

*anticipated lifting of sanctions in 2016 leads to a political process that strengthens ties between Iran and the west. Nevertheless, for the next 5 to 10 years, the country's complex and outdated business environment will remain a major challenge for foreign investors to establish and sustain business operations in Iran.*

*Enabling power: Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, ss. 1 (1) (a) (c) (3), 3 (1) (a) (b) (i) (ii) (d) (i) (ii), (2) (b) (c), 4, 5, 9 (2) (a), 10 (2) (a) (c) (3) (4), 11 (2) to (9), 13, 15 (2) (a) (b), (3), (4) (b) (5) (6), 16, 17 (2) to (9), 19, 20 (1), 21 (1), 54 (1) (a) (2) (a), 56 (1), 62 (4) (5) (6), sch. 1, para. 2 (b), 3 (a) (b), 4 (b) (c), 5 (a) (ii) (b) (c) (d), 6 (a) (ii) (b), 7 (b), 11 (a), 13 (b) (h) (k) (f) (m) (n) (w), 14 (a) (f) (k), 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27. Issued: 12.03.2019. Sifted: -. Made: 05.03.2019. Laid: 07.03.2019. Coming into force: In accord. with reg. 1 (2). Effect: S.I. 2016/36, 503; 2007/281 revoked. Territorial extent & classification: E/W/S/NI. General. EC note: Council Regulation (EU) no. 267/2012 revoked*

*Nations and international organizations are increasingly using sanctions as a means to achieve their foreign policy aims. However, sanctions are ineffective if they are executed without a clear strategy responsive to the nature and changing behavior of the target. In *The Art of Sanctions*, Richard Nephew offers a much-needed practical framework for planning and applying sanctions that focuses not just on the initial sanctions strategy but also, crucially, on how to calibrate along the way and how to decide when sanctions have achieved maximum effectiveness. Nephew—a leader in the design and implementation of sanctions on Iran—develops guidelines for interpreting targets' responses to sanctions based on two critical factors: pain and resolve. The efficacy of sanctions lies in the application of pain against a target, but targets may have significant resolve to resist, tolerate, or overcome this pain. Understanding the interplay of pain and resolve is central to using sanctions both successfully and humanely. With attention to these two key variables, and to how they change over the course of a sanctions regime, policy makers can pinpoint when diplomatic intervention is likely to succeed or when escalation is necessary. Focusing on lessons learned from sanctions on both Iran and Iraq, Nephew provides policymakers with practical guidance on how to measure and respond to pain and resolve in the service of strong and successful sanctions regimes.*

*Seminar paper from the year 2020 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: International relations, grade: 1,3, University of Applied Sciences Essen, language: English,*

*abstract: This essay aims to specify the theoretical basis of sanctions on Iran, afterwards focusing on the US Sanctions specifically. The history of the US-Iranian relationship is going to be described. Another goal is to outline the consequences that these sanctions have on the USA and Iran, but also on international trade up to now. This paper is divided into three sections. The first part explains the theoretical basis of sanctions including its definition, the different forms and reasons for sanctions as well as the legal requirements. In the main part, the US sanctions, its historical context as well as the goals and consequences of the US sanctions against Iran are presented. In the last part, a conclusion is drawn.*

*Iran Sanctions*

*History and Current Policy*

*The Art of Sanctions*

*A Financial Anatomy of Economic Sanctions*

*Iran-China Oil Trade. Impact of the sanctions on the oil cooperation between Iran and China*

*The case of Iran-US relations*

***Master's Thesis from the year 2018 in the subject Economics - Foreign Trade Theory, Trade Policy, grade: 10, , course: Thesis, language: English, abstract: China and Iran have had a long history of economic, social, and military cooperation which spans over hundreds of years ago. This kind of cooperation has been preserved up to the present moment in which the relationship between the two countries is more directed to mutual economic benefits. While Iran benefits from military and technological support from China, China obtains oil to fuel its rapidly growing economy since the amount it produces on its own is not sufficient to run the economy. Ultimately, the relationship between the two countries has culminated into an oil cooperation in which China has been entrusted with a majority of oil exploration tenders in Iran especially during the period in which economic sanctions had been issued against Iran. China remained an ally to Iran despite calls from the Western economic giants for the abandonment of bilateral relations with Iran as a punishment for its refusal to abide by the nuclear deal initiated by the United States. As a result, the oil cooperation has deepened mainly because China has been the main partner to Iran in a period during which economic sanctions were hitting hard on the country's economy. However, the sanctions were recently lifted, allowing Iran to go back to the global oil market. The main aim of this study was to***

***assess the impact the lifting of the sanctions could have on the oil cooperation between Iran and China. The researcher implemented a quantitative approach in which three measures were performed; the value of Iran's oil-related exports to China prior to and after the lifting of sanctions, the value of Iran's exports to the entire world prior to and after the lifting of sanctions, and the value of Iran's exports to China expressed as a percentage of the total value of Iran's oil-related exports to the world. Findings illustrated that the value of Iran's oil exports to China indicated a rising trend prior to the lifting of economic sanctions and a falling trend after lifting of the sanctions. On the other hand, Iran's exports to the entire world illustrated a falling trend prior to the lifting of sanctions and a rising trend after lifting of sanctions. China's falling trend indicates that bilateral relations between China and Iran are reducing since Iran is focusing more on the global oil market (rising trend for the oil exports to the world).***

***Iran is emerging as a significant cyberthreat to the US and its allies. The size and sophistication of the nation's hacking capabilities have grown markedly over the last few years, and Iran has already penetrated well-defended networks in the US and Saudi Arabia and seized and destroyed sensitive data. The lifting of economic sanctions as a result of the recently announced framework for a nuclear deal with Iran will dramatically increase the resources Iran can put toward expanding its cyberattack infrastructure. Iran is emerging as a significant cyberthreat to the US and its allies. The size and sophistication of the nation's hacking capabilities have grown markedly over the last few years, and Iran has already penetrated well-defended networks in the US and Saudi Arabia and seized and destroyed sensitive data. The lifting of economic sanctions as a result of the recently announced framework for a nuclear deal with Iran will dramatically increase the resources Iran can put toward expanding its cyberattack infrastructure. A particular challenge is that the Islamic Republic has two sets of information technology infrastructure, the one it is building in Iran and the one it is renting and buying in the West. Both are attacking the computer systems of America and its allies, and both are influenced to different degrees by the regime and its security services. We cannot think of the Iranian cyberfootprint as confined to Iranian soil. That fact creates great dangers for the West, but also offers opportunities. Whatever the final***

**outcome of the nuclear negotiations, we must expect that the threat of a cyberattack from Iran will continue to grow. We may have just enough time to get ready to meet that threat. Sanctions have constricted Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry. However, the sanctions have not halted Iran's provision of arms to the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government and related Shiite militias, Houthi rebels in Yemen, or to other pro-Iranian factions in the Middle East. Nor have sanctions altered Iran's repression of dissent or monitoring of the Internet. Under the JPA, the United States has provided Iran with some sanctions relief through presidential waivers of several U.S. sanctions laws and authority under several executive orders. The core of the sanctions relief is \$700 million per month in access to hard currency from oil sales, plus about \$65 million per month in additional hard currency provided to educational institutions for Iranians studying abroad. The JPA caps Iran's oil exports at about 1mbd but does not cap exports to its crude oil customers of oil products such as condensates, and Iran appears to have increasing exports of condensates to partly compensate for the limitations on crude oil sales. The JPA suspends sanctions on Iran's auto manufacturing sector and on its sales of petrochemicals, although available data indicates activity in these sectors does not appear to be producing nearly as much revenue as was estimated. And, the fall in oil prices since June 2014 has introduced additional uncertainty to Iran's economy, to the point where many experts assess that Iranian leaders urgently need a comprehensive nuclear deal to achieve the economic improvement demanded by the population. By all accounts, a comprehensive nuclear agreement, if reached, will entail significant easing of U.S. and third country sanctions on Iran—particularly those sanctions that reduced Iran's oil exports and limit its access to the international financial system. The Administration has said that substantial sanctions relief under a comprehensive deal would be provided, but would be implemented stepwise as Iran fulfills the terms of an agreement. The Administration has asserted that, in the event of an agreement, it will act on its own authority to suspend most sanctions on Iran and, after testing Iran's compliance over a period of time, work with Congress on long-term sanctions relief. Some in Congress are proposing additional sanctions if diplomacy fails, but the Administration strongly opposes enacting additional sanctions while**

**talks are ongoing. The Administration asserts that doing so will fracture the coalition negotiating with Iran and cause Iran to walk away from the talks. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack; and CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.**

**A comprehensive but concise overview of Iran's politics, economy, military, foreign policy, and nuclear program. The volume chronicles U.S.-Iran relations under six American presidents and probes five options for dealing with Iran. Organized thematically, this book provides top-level briefings by 50 top experts on Iran (both Iranian and Western authors) and is a practical and accessible "go-to" resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, and students, as well as a fascinating wealth of information for anyone interested in understanding Iran's pivotal role in world politics.**

**Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy**

**A Framework to Identify and Assess Business Opportunities in Post-Sanctions Markets**

**The Growing Cyberthreat from Iran**

**Feeling Good Or Doing Good with Sanctions**

**Iran. Strategic Entry Into a Shifting Business Landscape**

*This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of economic sanctions and measures the effect of imposing and lifting sanctions on the target country's exchange-listed, publicly traded firms and examines how the impact of sanctions on deep state-owned firms differs from their impact on other firms. The paper uses the case of Iran because of its developed financial markets, the length and variety of sanctions, the significant presence of deep state firms in the market, and the unique event of the 2015 nuclear deal which led to lifting some of the imposed sanctions. I find that a direct sanction against a firm or industry leads to cumulative short-term and long-term negative abnormal returns. The effect is stronger for the deep state firms. In the case of multiple sanctions against a firm by different jurisdictions, the effect of the first sanction is the strongest one. This may hint that the widely-held belief that unilateral sanctions are not effective is not necessarily true. The removal of sanctions leads to positive abnormal returns; the positive abnormal returns are weaker for the deep state firms. Firms targeted by economic sanctions decrease their leverage and increase their cash holding to manage their increased risk, and economic sanctions worsen profitability ratios. The paper provides valuable insights into the mechanics of economic sanctions and backs them with robust quantitative analysis.*

*This paper uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran with and without strategic responses. Iran benefits the most, with average per capita welfare gains ranging from close to 3 percent, in the case when Iran's crude oil exports to the European Union recover to half their pre-embargo level, to 6.5 percent, in the best case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, successful domestic reforms that enable a strong supply response, and increased market access for Iranian exports in developed markets. Iran could achieve benefits close to the upper range if Gulf Cooperation Council oil exporters limit their crude oil exports to support the oil price. If they do nothing, however, the price of oil will decline by 13 percent in the case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, leaving net oil importers better off and net oil exporters worse off.*

*Controversy has surrounded the Iran nuclear deal since it was signed two years ago. Although the main stipulations of the agreement have been successfully implemented--Iran has so far complied with the restrictions on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions--the agreement continues to generate harsh criticism in both Iran and the United States. The promise of the deal includes not only rolling back Iran's nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future but also paving the way toward a more constructive diplomatic relationship between Washington and Tehran. Its survival, however, depends on complex and turbulent domestic politics in both countries. Since he started his bid for office, President Donald Trump has been a forceful detractor of the agreement, repeatedly vowing to dismantle it. Today, his administration is conducting a review of its Iran policy, of which the nuclear deal is a critical component. He has already indicated that he wants to increase pressure on Iran, and his administration has upped the ante with the Islamic Republic, including by suggesting that America is looking to support elements pursuing a transition of power in that country. But the nuclear deal affords the United States a number of opportunities, if the administration sustains it. The United States should clearly reaffirm its commitment to the deal; help reintegrate Iran into the international economy; keep official channels of communication open with Tehran; and engage, rather than isolate, the Islamic Republic.*

*In July 2015, the major world powers agreed to lift economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran provided that it gives up parts of its nuclear program. Being inhabited by over 80 million people and possessing many natural resources, Iran represents a very attractive market for Swiss companies. This thesis builds a theoretical framework to assess the market attractiveness of any post-sanctions markets for a chosen industry and provides a set of appropriate strategic responses to mitigate, control, and avoid the identified risks. This easy-to-follow and practice-oriented methodology is applied to analyze the Iranian market attractiveness for the Swiss MEM industry. Findings suggest a substantial growth in Iran's demand for MEM products over the next years. Although Swiss companies have to cope with the high Swiss Franc, they benefit from an extremely positive image and reputation in Iran. Nevertheless, the global competitive environment remains strong with the entry of new key players from China. Other identified areas of risks include the unfavorable business environment in Iran, the potential repeal of the JCPOA, and reputational damage. Overall, the market potential outweighs the risks and the author advises Swiss MEM companies to examine the possibility to integrate Iran as a key export destination.*

*2015 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Iran  
Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy*

*Iran Has Opened Up to the World -- and Organizations are Rushing to Tap the Project Potential*

*Global Effects and Strategic Responses*

*The Iran Primer*

*U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions*

The definitive book on Obama's historic nuclear deal with Iran from the author of the Foreign Affairs Best Book on the Middle East in 2012. This timely book focuses on President Obama's deeply considered strategy toward Iran's nuclear program and reveals how the historic agreement of 2015 broke the persistent stalemate in negotiations that had blocked earlier efforts. The deal accomplished two major feats in one stroke: it averted the threat of war with Iran and prevented the possibility of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Trita Parsi, a Middle East foreign policy expert who advised the Obama White House throughout the talks and had access to decision-makers and diplomats on the U.S. and Iranian sides alike, examines every facet of a triumph that could become as important and consequential as Nixon's rapprochement with China. Drawing from more than seventy-five in-depth interviews with key decision-makers, including Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, this is the first authoritative account of President Obama's signature foreign policy achievement.

The Obama administration has made remarkable progress in unifying the international community behind tough sanctions on Iran, but it has not achieved its goal of persuading Tehran to curb its nuclear program. Like a frog in a pot of water that is gradually getting hotter, Iran has adjusted to sanctions and even benefited by lifting consumer subsidies that distorted its economy. It is unlikely that the water will reach its boiling point so long as China maintains close economic ties with Iran and the price of oil remains stubbornly high. The U.S. should work with the other members of the P5+1 to reach a common stance on uranium enrichment that would allow Iran to save face while alleviating proliferation concerns. The United States has led the international community in imposing economic sanctions on Iran, in an effort to change the government of that country's support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and development of a nuclear program. This report identifies the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, and the nature of the authority to waive or lift those restrictions. It comprises two tables that present legislation and executive orders that are specific to Iran and its objectionable activities in the areas of terrorism, human rights, and weapons proliferation. It will be updated if and when new legislation is enacted, or, in the case of executive orders, if and when the President takes additional steps to change U.S. policy toward Iran. Other CRS reports address the U.S.-Iran relationship, including a comprehensive discussion of the practical application of economic sanctions: CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman. See also CRS Report R43333, *Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord*, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr,

and Mary Beth D. Nikitin; CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

The Supreme Leader of Iran is dead. Within three hours, the Assembly of Experts names his successor. Will he bring change to Iran's relationship with the west or be their next nightmare? As the world waits, the new Supreme Leader plans to lift the economic sanctions against Iran once and for all. After the U.S. embassy in Islamabad becomes the victim of a terrorist attack, CIA operative Ben Thrasher learns that the terrorist responsible has a connection to a previous attack in India. When bombs go off at U.S. global service centers across India, he meets with his rival from India's Intelligence Bureau, Kedar Dhoni. The two agents must work together to discover the forces at hand before Iran initiates a plan to rule the Middle East using a secret connection to the Nazis. Meanwhile in the United States, former operative Tom Delang is working on a film deal regarding his escape from Iran when he is run off the road by an unknown assassin. After miraculously surviving, Delang enlists Kirk Kurruthers to help him determine if the attempt on his life is part of a plot to boost interest in the movie or if an old foe is out for revenge.

Preserving the Iran Nuclear Deal

The Rise of Sanctions As a Tool of Modern War

Inside Syria

Representation, recognition and respect in world politics

Iran's Nuclear Program, Sanctions Relief, and Associated Legal and Legislative Issues

The Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

The first international history of the emergence of economic sanctions during the interwar period and the legacy of this development Economic sanctions dominate the landscape of world politics today. First developed in the early twentieth century as a way of exploiting the flows of globalization to defend liberal internationalism, their appeal is that they function as an alternative to war. This view, however, ignores the dark paradox at their core: designed to prevent war, economic sanctions are modeled on devastating techniques of warfare. Tracing the use of economic sanctions from the blockades of World War I to the policing of colonial empires and the interwar confrontation with fascism, Nicholas Mulder uses extensive archival research in a political, economic, legal, and military history that reveals how a coercive wartime tool was adopted as an instrument of peacekeeping by the League of Nations. This timely study casts an overdue light on why sanctions are widely considered a form of war, and why their unintended consequences are so tremendous. This book provides an international legal analysis of the most important questions regarding Iran's nuclear program

since 2002. Setting these legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context, this book aims to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the on-going legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases. Some questions raised regard the watershed diplomatic accord reached between Iran and Western states in July, 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action. The answers will be of interests to diplomats and academics, as well as to anyone who is interested in understanding international law's application to this sensitive dispute in international relations.

Iran's Energy Policy After the Nuclear Deal

A View from the Field

Implementing the Iran Nuclear Deal

Adjusting to Lower Commodity Prices

US Sanctions against Iran. Historical Context, Goals and Consequences