Term Paper On Corruption

This volume presents the major outcomes of the third edition of the Future of Higher Education – Bologna Process Researchers Conference (FOHE-BPRC 3) which was held on 27-29 November 2017. It acknowledges the importance continued dialogue between researchers and decision-makers and benefits from the experience already acquired, thi enabling the higher education community to bring its input into the 2018-2020 European Higher Education Area (EH priorities. The Future of Higher Education – Bologna Process Researchers Conference (FOHE-BPRC) has already established itself as a landmark in the European higher education environment. The two previous editions (17-19 Oc 2011, 24-26 November 2014), with approximately 200 European and international participants each, covering more countries each, were organized prior to the Ministerial Conferences, thus encouraging a consistent dialogue betwee researchers and policy makers. The main conclusions of the FOHE Conferences were presented at the EHEA Minister Conferences (2012 and 2015), in order to make the voice of researchers better heard by European policy and decis This volume is dedicated to continuing the collection of evidence and research-based policymaking and further narro gap between policy and research within the EHEA and broader global contexts. It aims to identify the research areas require more attention prior to the anniversary 2020 EHEA Ministerial Conference, with an emphasis on the new iss rise in the academic and educational community. This book gives a platform for discussion on key issues between re various direct higher education actors, decision-makers, and the wider public. This book is published under an open a CC BY license.

Looks at Gender and corruption.

This book considers how emerging economies around the world face the challenge of building good institutions and governance, since so much of economic development depends on having these in place. The promotion of shared pro and the battle against poverty require interventions to reach out to the poor and the disadvantaged. Yet time and a have seen such effort foild or diminished by corruption and leakage. The creation of good governance and institution structures to combat corruption require determination and passion but also intricate design rooted in data, analysis research. In this book, leading researchers from around the world bring to the table some of the best available ideas create better governance structures, design laws for corruption control, and nurture good institutions.

"This paper utilizes a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What determines corruption at individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of corruption in the country? Does corruption have a impact on growth when the quality of the institutions are controlled for? In addition, the paper creates a direct mea corruption which portrays the extent of corruption as revealed byindividuals who live in those countries. The results that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, wea education, marital status, the city size, the legal origin of the country, the existence of uninterrupted democracy, a between 1960s and 1980s, and the strength of the institutions in the country (measured by the risk of expropriatio second part of the paper shows that controlling for endogeneity of corruption and institutional quality, actual corru the country and the proportion of the bribes asked by various government agencies have no direct impact on corrup perception. On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of institutions lowers the perception of corruption. Th section of the paper shows that controlling for the quality of the institutions, corruption does not have a direct imp growth. Keeping constant the geographical location of the country, the legal origin, religious composition, the presen war, the federal status, initial education and income as well as the extent of corruption in the country, a one-half st deviation increase in the quality of institutions (e.g. from the level of Indonesia to the level of India), generates an a 0.7 percentage point increase in the average annual per capita GDP growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research site.

International Evidence from Micro Data

An Ethnographic Approach

Lessons to be Learnt

Corruption in Public Administration

Motivations for Public Service in Corrupt States

Corruption: A Very Short Introduction

The problem of corruption is of central significance for the developmental prospects of poor countries. Corruption undermines development by siphoning off resources for infrastructures and public services and by weakening the legitimacy of the state. The volume will appeal to academics and policy-makers concerned with problems of governa and public management in developing countries, as well as specialists working on corruption and designing anti-corruption strategies.

Corruption is one of the most discussed concepts in the world. Usages escalate from bribery through untoward bus government connections on up to culture and human nature. Measures at the national level include amalgamations o perceptions and of "experience." Since corruption conveys shame and blame, concepts and measures are especially controversial. This paper shows how definitions can be induced from examples and framed in terms of political econo models. It examines the coherence, reliability, and predictive power of measures of corruption. Although this paper d with corruption, it may serve as a methodological warm-up exercise for other important topics in the social science democracy to mental health, from sustainability to poverty, where we need to clarify what we are talking about.

Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have hi costs than benefits.

It is common practice to assume that business practices are universally similar. Business and social attitudes t corruption, however, vary according to the wide variety of cultural norms across the countries of the world. In business involves complex, ethically challenging, and sometimes threatening, dilemmas that can involve political personal agendas. Corruption in International Business presents a broad range of perspectives on how corrupti defined; the responsibilities of those working for publicly traded companies to their shareholders; and the posit influences that corporations can have upon combating international corruption. The authors differentiate betwe and private sector corruption and explore the implications of both, as well as methods for qualifying and quant corruption and the challenges facing policy makers, legal systems, corporations, and NGOs, as they seek to miti effects of corruption and enable cultural and social change.

The Relationship between National Culture and Corruption. A mixed Methods Research
Thinking about Bribery
Perceptions of Corruption in Victoria [electronic Resource]
A Review of Contemporary Research
Perceptions of Corruption in Victoria
Corruption Around the World

Bribery is perhaps the most visible and most frequently studied form of corruption. Very little research, however, examines the individual decision to offer or accept a bribe, or how understanding that decision can help to effectively control bribery. This book brings together research by scholars from a variety of disciplines studying the mind and morality, who use their research to explain how and why decisions regarding participation in bribery are made. It first examines bribery from the perspective of brain structure, then approaches the decision to engage in bribery from a cognitive perspective. It examines the psychological costs imposed on a person who engages in bribery, and studies societal and organizational norms and their impact on bribery. This is an ideal read for scholars and other interested persons studying business ethics, bribery and corruption, corruption control, and the applications of neuroscience in a business environment.

Essay from the year 2010 in the subject Politics - Miscellaneous, grade: Good Pass, University of Portsmouth, language: English, abstract: In contemporary times, corruption has become a major issue in both the public and private sector; numerous studies (KPMG 2010, ACFE 2010, etc.) are devoted to the causes,underlying factors and triggers of corruption in the society, despite the fact that researchers doubt the statistical validity of these studies, but they nevertheless agree that corruption is positively related to the economic growth of a nation, and therefore needs to be controlled (Webster, 2002, p. 6) however even when the corruption element has been identified, the serious obstacle still remains- the challenges posed to the measurement of corruption. This paper will focus on the two closely related phenomenons: corruption and fraud; the study is centered on the problems with the measurement of these elements in the private sector. Furthermore the assumption that fraud is measurable while corruption is not, will be explored and critically assessed in detail.

This first report deals with some of the major development issues confronting the developing countries and explores the relationship of the major trends in the international economy to them. It is designed to help clarify some of the linkages between the international economy and domestic strategies in the developing countries against the background of growing interdependence and increasing complexity in the world economy. It assesses the prospects for progress in accelerating growth and alleviating poverty, and identifies some of the major policy issues which will affect these prospects.

The United States today, according to most studies, is among the least corrupt nations in the world. But America's past was checkered with political scandal and widespread corruption that would not seem unusual compared with the most corrupt developing nation today. We construct a "corruption and fraud index" using word counts from a large number of newspapers for 1815 to 1975, supplemented with other historical facts. The index reveals that America experienced a substantial decrease in corruption from 1870 to 1920, particularly from the late-1870s to the mid-1880s and again in the 1910s. At its peak in the 1870s the "corruption and fraud index" is about five times its level from the end of the Progressive Era to the 1970s. If the United States was once considerably more corrupt than it is today, then America's history should offer lessons about how to reduce corruption. How did America become a less corrupt polity, economy, and society? We review the findings and insights from a series of essays for a conference volume, Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's History, for which this paper is the introduction that attempt to understand the remarkable evolution of corruption and reform in U.S. history.

Corruption, Business Environment, and Small Business Fixed Investment In India
A Framework for Evaluation
Essay in the Field of Private Sector Fraud and Corruption
Comparing Anti-corruption Measures in Asian Countries
A Brief Review
Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption

This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unifies them is "experiments on corruption and preferences." The first essay (chapter 2) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of yardstick competition (a form of government competition) on corruption. The second essay (chapter 3) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of efficiency and transparency on corruption. Furthermore, this essay revisits the yardstick competition question by implementing an alternative experimental design and protocol. Finally, the third essay (chapter 4) reports a theory-testing randomized field experiment that identifies the causes and consequences of corruption. The first essay finds the following. Theoretically, the paper derives a main proposition which suggests that institutions with more noise give rise to an increase in corrupt behavior and a decrease in voter welfare. Empirically, the paper finds a few key results. First, there are an initial nontrivial proportion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down as the experiment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model. Third, overall evidence of yardstick competition is mild. Yardstick competition has little effect as a corruption-taming mechanism when the proportion of good incumbents is low. Namely, an institution that is characterized by a small number of good incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. Thus, incumbents have less of an incentive to build a reputation. This is also the case in which (1) yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents. Finally, a partitioning of the data by gender suggests that males and females exhibit different degrees of learning depending on the payoffs they face. Furthermore, male voter behavior exhibits mild evidence of yardstick competition when voters face the pooling equilibrium payoff. The second essay finds the following. First, efficiency is an important determinant of corruption. A decrease in efficiency makes it more costly for incumbents to "do the right thing." This drives them to divert maximum rents. While voters retaliate slightly, voters tend to be worse off. Secondly, increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as defined in terms of an increase in risk

in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. In particular, if the draw of the unit cost is unfavorable, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. Third, there is strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent is female. On the voter's side, voters are less likely to re-elect the incumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specifically, voters pay attention to the difference between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and that in another. As this difference increases, voters re-elect less. This gives true meaning to the concept of "benchmarking." Finally, the analysis sheds light on the role of history and beliefs on behavior. Beliefs are an important determinant of incumbents' choices. If an incumbent perceives a tax signal to be associated with a higher likelihood of re-election, he is more likely to choose it. On the voter's side, history tends to be important. In particular, voters are more likely to vote out incumbents as time progresses. This suggests that incumbents care about tax signals because they provide access to re-elections while voters use the history of taxes and re-elections in addition to current taxes to formulate their re-election decisions. Finally, the third essay finds the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% and this finding is significant at the 10% level. This finding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which implies that this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain shirking on the part of mail handlers. Third, we find that loss of mail is non-random across other observables. In particular, middle-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost (money) mail. Also, female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost mail while female heads of household in high-income neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail. Finally, this form of corruption is costly to different stakeholders. The sender of mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. The direct cost is the value of the mail. The indirect cost is the cost of having to switch carriers once mail has been lost. Corruption is also costly to the intended mail recipient as discussed above. Finally, corruption is costly the mail company (SERPOST) in terms of lost revenue and to society in terms of loss of trust. Overall, the findings suggest that public-private partnerships need not increase efficiency by reducing corruption; particularly, when the institution remains a monopoly. Increased efficiency in mail delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition; otherwise, the monopolist has no incentive to provide better service and loss of mail is likely to persist.

'Amidst the seemingly never-ending stream of volumes being published on corruption, it is rare to come across one that has something genuinely new to contribute to the debate about how to understand and combat it. Yet, Davide Torsello has done precisely that in assembling this important collection of essays that explore administrative corruption from an ethnographic, rather than a technocratic, perspective. With chapters on countries as diverse as Bosnia, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Mexico, Russia, Tanzania and Turkey, this new collection offers fascinating insights into how the everyday reality of corruption is experienced and understood, helping to explain why abstract models based on assumptions about human motivation offer poor guides to effective anti-corruption action. With a particular focus on the meaning of public and private goods, and the nature of gift-exchange in different cultures, the volume offers practical guidelines for policy-makers in regard to improving practices in public administration.'- Paul M Heywood, University of Nottingham, UK In a largely corruption-free environment, anti-corruption agencies, ethics offices, and ombudsmen strengthen the standards of accountability. In countries with endemic corruption, however, the same institutions function in form but not in substance; under a best case scenario such institutions might be helpful, but the more likely outcome is that they help to preserve social justice.

Corruption is one of the biggest global issues, ahead of extreme poverty, unemployment, the rising cost of food and energy, climate change, and terrorism. It is thought to be one of the principal causes of poverty around the globe. Its significance in the contemporary world cannot be undervalued. In this Very Short Introduction Leslie Holmes considers why the international community has only highlighted corruption as a problem in the past two decades, despite its presence throughout the millennia. Holmes explores the phenomenon from several different perspectives, from the cultural differences affecting how corruption is defined, its impact, and its various causes to the possible remedies. Providing evidence of corruption and considering ways to address it around the world, this is an important introduction to a significant and serious global issue. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

An Introduction
Lessons Learned
Neuroscience, Moral Cognition and the Psychology of Bribery
Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia
Corruption and Trade Tariffs, Or a Case for Uniform Tariffs
Corruption and Reform

A passionate examination of why international anti-corruption fails to deliver results and how we should understand and build good governance.

Performance based oversight and accountability can serve as an important antidote to government corruption, inefficiency, and waste. This volume provides an analytical framework and operational approaches needed for the implementation of results-based accountability. The volume makes a major contribution to the literature on public management and evaluation. Major subject areas covered in this book include: performance based accountability, e-government, network solutions to performance measurement and improvement; institutions of accountability in governance; legal and institutional framework to hold government to account; fighting corruption; external accountability; ensuring integrity of revenue administration; the role of supreme audit institutions on detecting fraud and corruption; and the role of parliamentary budget offices and public

accounts committees.

A highly diversified trade tariff menu may fuel bribe-taking behavior. Setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public officials' ability to extract bribes from importers.

This book aims to gather the insight of leading experts on corruption and anti-corruption studies working at the scientific frontier of this phenomenon using the multidisciplinary tools of data and network science, in order to present current theoretical, empirical, and operational efforts being performed in order to curb this problem. The research results strengthen the importance of evidence-based approaches in the fight against corruption in all its forms, and foster the discussion about the best ways to convert the obtained knowledge into public policy. The contributed chapters provide comprehensive and multidisciplinary approaches to handle the non-trivial structural and dynamical aspects that characterize the modern social, economic, political and technological systems where corruption takes place. This book will serve a broad multi-disciplinary audience from natural to social scientists, applied mathematicians, including law and policymakers.

Corruption, Public Finances and the Unofficial Economy

Corruption Under Moral Hazard

Research Paper

Corruption and Development

The Challenge of Cultural and Legal Diversity

The Concept of Systemic Corruption in American Political and Economic History

This new edition of a 1999 classic shows how institutionalized corruption can be fought through sophisticated political-economic reform.

In this sample of 49 Latin America, OECD, and transition economies, it is the ineffective and discretionary administration of tax and regulatory regimes--not higher tax rates alone--as well as corruption, that increases the size of the unofficial economy. And countries with a large unofficial economy tend to grow more slowly.

Corruption is attracting a lot of attention around the world. The paper surveys and discusses issues related to the causes, consequences, and scope of corruption and possible corrective actions. It emphasizes the costs of corruption in terms of economic growth. It also emphasizes that the fight against corruption may not be cheap and cannot be independent from the reform of the state. If certain reforms are not made, corruption is likely to continue to be a problem regardless of actions directly aimed at curtailing it.

This paper utilizes a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What determines corruption at the individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of corruption in the country? Does corruption have a direct impact on growth when the quality of the institutions are controlled for? In addition, the paper creates a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of corruption as revealed byindividuals who live in those countries. The results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, wealth, education, marital status, the city size, the legal origin of the country, the existence of uninterrupted democracy, a war between 1960s and 1980s, and the strength of the institutions in the country (measured by the risk of expropriation). The second part of the paper shows that controlling for endogeneity of corruption and institutional quality, actual corruption in the country and the proportion of the bribes asked by various government agencies have no direct impact on corruption perception. On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of institutions lowers the perception of corruption. The final section of the paper shows that controlling for the quality of the institutions, corruption does not have a direct impact on growth. Keeping constant the geographical location of the country, the legal origin, religious composition, the presence of a war, the federal status, initial education and income as well as the extent of corruption in the country, a one-half standard deviation increase in the quality of institutions (e.g. from the level of Indonesia to the level of India), generates an additional 0.7 percentage point increase in the average annual per capita GDP growth.

Drivers of Corruption

The Quest for Good Governance

Survey Techniques to Measure and Explain Corruption

What Determines Corruption?

Concepts and Applications

The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform

The critical role of governance in the promotion of economic development has created intense interest in the manner in which the United States eliminated corruption. This paper examines the concept of corruption in American history; tracing the term corruption to its roots in British political philosophy of the 17th and 18th century, and from there back to Machiavelli, Polybius and Artistole. Corruption was defined prior to 1850 in a way that was significantly different from how it was defined in the Progressive Era. "Systematic corruption" embodied the idea that political actors manipulated the economic system to create economic rents that politicians could use to secure control of the government. In other words, politics corrupts economics. The classic cure for systematic corruption was balanced government. Americans fought for independence because they believed that the British government was corrupt. The structure of American constitutions was shaped by the need to implement balanced government. Conflict and debate over the implementation of balanced government dominated the political agenda until the 1840s, when states began moving regulatory policy firmly towards open entry and free competition. By the 1890s, systematic corruption had essentially appeared from political discourse. By then corruption had come to take on its modern meaning: the idea that economic interests corrupt the political process. What modern developing countries with

corrupt governments need to learn is how the United States eliminated systematic corruption.

This report provides an overview of arguments explaining the risk of corruption. Corrupt acts are subject to decision making authority and assets available for grabbing. These assets can be stolen, created by artificial shortage, or become available as the result of a market failure. Assets that are especially exposed to corruption include profits from the private sector, revenues from the export of natural resources, aid and loans, and the proceeds of crime. Whether or not opportunities for corruption are exploited depends on the individuals involved, the institution or society they are part of, and the law enforcement circumstances. Corruption usually persists in situations in which players are aware of the facts but nonetheless condone the practice. Absence of reaction can result from information asymmetries (in which the people who are supposed to act are not aware of the need to act), coordination failure, patronage-determined loyalty, and incentive problems at the political level. This review of results and insights from different parts of the scholarly literature on corruption focuses on areas where research can guide anticorruption policy. The report also describes a number of corruption-related challenges in need of more attention from researchers.

Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.

Perceptions of Corruption in VictoriaResearch PaperCorruption: A Very Short IntroductionOUP Oxford

Addressing Corruption Openly

Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century
Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures
Corruption Networks
Anti-corruption Policies and Programs

Throughout much of the world, corruption in the civil service undermines state capacity, impedes economic development, and saps citizens' morale. But while its pernicious effects are widely recognized, the roots of corruption remain poorly understood. Whereas most studies on corruption's origins focus on the incentives bureaucrats face once in office, this study contributes to a line of recently emerging research that considers the role of self-selection of citizens with a propensity for corruption into bureaucracies where corruption is known to be widespread. Drawing on a survey and experimental games conducted with students at an elite university in Moscow, Russia, we compare the attitudinal, behavioral, and demographic traits of students seeking public sector employment to the traits of their peers seeking jobs in the private sector. Contrary to studies conducted in other high-corruption contexts, such as India, we find surprising evidence that students who prefer a public sector career display less willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as higher levels of altruism. One interpretation of these findings is that corruption in Russia results from the transformation of bureaucrats' behavior and attitudes after entering the civil service, rather than through a process of corrupt self-selection.

Is there any hope for those who despair at the state of the world and the powerlessness of governments to find a way forward? Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century provides ambitious but reasonable proposals to give our globalized world the institutions of international governance necessary to address effectively the catastrophic risks facing humanity that are beyond national control. The solution, the authors suggest, is to extend to the international level the same principles of sensible governance that exist in well-governed national systems: rule of law, legislation in the common interest, an executive branch to implement such legislation, and courts to enforce it. The best protection is unified collective action, based on shared values and respect for diversity, to implement widely accepted international principles to advance universal human prosperity and well-being. This title is also available as Open Access.

This paper outlines the IMF's perspective on the economic impact of corrup-tion and experience in helping countries design and implement strategies to address it. Corruption has a broader cor¬rosive

impact on society. It undermines trust in government and erodes the ethical standards of private citizens. A holistic, multi-faceted approach is needed—one that establishes appropriate incentives and the rule of law, promotes transparency, and introduces economic reforms that reduce opportunities for illicit behavior. Perhaps the most import¬ant ingredient for a successful anticorruption approach is the development of strong institu¬tions, centered on a professional civil service that is sufficiently independent from both private influence and political interference. Corruption afflicts countries at all stages of development. Indeed, some developing coun¬tries score better on corruption indices than many advanced countries. Corruption has a pernicious effect on the economy. Pervasive corruption makes it harder to conduct sound fiscal policy. Corruption also undermines certain types of public expenditure to the detriment of economic performance.

Seminar paper from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Business Ethics, Corporate Ethics, grade: 2,0, VU University Amsterdam , language: English, abstract: This work focuses on the relationship between national culture and corruption. After conducting a thorough study on the topic and taking insights from the interviews with experts, this paper aims to fill in this gap and make a contribution to the research topic by taking a cultural approach, in which determinants of corruption in are examined. This paper will provide new findings how the cultural aspects interrelate with the two concepts, i.e. economic and institutional. The research will close the gap between the economic and institutional approaches that currently exist in the academic world. The relevance of this consideration is justified because the costs associated with corruption do not affect only the economic outcomes. Its impact on society is much wider, what makes it relevant to research the cultural aspect of corruption and, therefore, close this existing gap. Corruption has become one of the forefront managerial issues both at the national and international levels. The concept of corruption is complex and multilateral and it varies across countries. Its different types of expressiveness and intensity can be felt all over the world and have the potential to cause severe complications for a country's economy and environmental sustainability.

Corruption

Essays on Corruption and Preferences

Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption

Corruption, Education, and Growth

What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Corruption?

Causes, Consequences, and Reform