

## **The Absence Of Grand Strategy The United States In The Persian Gulf 1972 2005**

This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Introduction. No Grand Strategy -- 1. Exploring Great Powers in Regions -- 2. The Nixon Administration's Twin Pillars -- 3. The Reagan Administration and the Iran-Iraq War -- 4. The Bush Administration and Constructive Engagement -- 5. The Iraq War of 1991 -- 6. The Clinton Administration and Saddam Hussein -- 7. Containment-Plus and Regime Change in Iraq -- 8. The Iraq War of 2003 -- 9. The Decline of Balance-of-Power Policy -- 10. The Balance Sheet, So to Speak -- 11. Theory, Strategy, and Realism -- Conclusion. Reactive Engagement -- Appendix: Core Interviews -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

The Absence of Grand Strategy The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005 JHU Press  
“The international world of states and their modern system is a literary realm,” writes Charles Hill in this powerful work on the practice of international relations. “It is where the greatest issues of the human condition are played out.” A distinguished lifelong diplomat and educator, Hill aims to revive the ancient tradition of statecraft as practiced by humane and broadly educated men and women. Through lucid and compelling discussions of classic literary works from Homer to Rushdie, Grand Strategies represents

a merger of literature and international relations, inspired by the conviction that “a grand strategist . . . needs to be immersed in classic texts from Sun Tzu to Thucydides to George Kennan, to gain real-world experience through internships in the realms of statecraft, and to bring this learning and experience to bear on contemporary issues.” This fascinating and engaging introduction to the basic concepts of the international order not only defines what it is to build a civil society through diplomacy, justice, and lawful governance but also describes how these ideas emerge from and reflect human nature.

The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy

The Case For Restraint

Defense Department's Path to Strategic Collapse

The Grand Strategy of the United States

American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the 21st Century

The Long Game

Past, Present, and Future

***This study is designed to contribute to the current efforts to reform the United States' foreign policy and national security capabilities. It addresses contemporary problems with specific policy and structural recommendations, but also aims to teach lessons in diplomacy and strategy that apply to all times and places. The author asserts that the U.S. needs a successful long-term national strategy integrating all the instruments of statecraft to influence the world positively to restore its ability to win friends, allies, politically motivated intelligence sources, and the resultant ability to achieve peace and security.***

***To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China's grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.***

***Exploring what we know—and don't know—about how nuclear weapons shape American grand strategy and international relations The world first confronted the power of nuclear weapons***

**when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The global threat of these weapons deepened in the following decades as more advanced weapons, aggressive strategies, and new nuclear powers emerged. Ever since, countless books, reports, and articles—and even a new field of academic inquiry called “security studies”—have tried to explain the so-called nuclear revolution. Francis J. Gavin argues that scholarly and popular understanding of many key issues about nuclear weapons is incomplete at best and wrong at worst. Among these important, misunderstood issues are: how nuclear deterrence works; whether nuclear coercion is effective; how and why the United States chose its nuclear strategies; why countries develop their own nuclear weapons or choose not to do so; and, most fundamentally, whether nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous. These and similar questions still matter because nuclear danger is returning as a genuine threat. Emerging technologies and shifting great-power rivalries seem to herald a new type of cold war just three decades after the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict that was characterized by periodic prospects of global Armageddon. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy helps policymakers wrestle with the latest challenges. Written in a clear, accessible, and jargon-free manner, the book also offers insights for students, scholars, and others interested in both the history and future of nuclear danger.**

**The book explores the competing grand strategic worldviews shaping India’s foreign and security policies by analyzing the interaction between normative modern international relations theories and vernacular concepts of statecraft and strategy. To assess the diverse competing ideas which characterize India’s debates on grand strategy and foreign policy, the author presents the subculture-cleavage model of grand strategic thought. This innovative analytical framework reveals the complexities of India’s strategic pluralism and offers the building blocks for a systematic analysis of grand strategy formation. The book demonstrates that the strategic paradigms, or strategic subcultures, are marked by contending ideas of Indian statehood and civilization, held by policymakers and the informed public, and are a result of ideology-driven perceptions of the country’s strategic environment. The author argues that the apparent hybridization and stretching of modern and traditional concepts of international relations in India has become a widespread feature of Indian foreign policy to**

**meet the needs of state formation and nation-building. A unique approach to organizing and understanding the debates and discourse in Indian strategic thinking, the book will be of interest to specialists and students in the field of International Relations, political theory, South Asian Studies, and India's foreign and security policy.**

**China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order**

**Forging an American Grand Strategy**

**Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush**

**Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy**

**Making America Grand Again**

**Securing a Path Through a Complex Future - Topics Include Eight Myths, Department of Homeland Security Approach, President's Role, Lessons from Singapore**

**A Grand Strategy for America**

*For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response.*

*Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.*

*This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis. Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is. Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how*

four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come. This book focuses on grand strategic approaches to the South China Sea dispute by major powers in the region -- those capable of projecting force to the South China Sea and abroad. It explores international dimensions of the South China Sea dispute, and how military, diplomatic, and economic strategies of global actors have both contributed to solutions and exacerbated conflict. Key international organizations and major powers have their own chapters, including China, the United States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), Japan, India, Australia, and Russia. The book is unique in the existing literature in that it provides an all-encompassing, interconnected, and theoretical explanation of major powers involved in the South China Sea conflict. Grand strategy -- which includes not only military, but economic, political, and diplomatic strategies, is addressed in the volume as a whole. Authors seek to put the grand strategies of the major powers into analytic juxtaposition to determine likely outcomes of, and optimal major power strategies for, the South China Sea conflict over time. The volume focuses on the deeper aspects of grand strategy and history, not customarily in the daily news coverage of incidents-at-sea and negotiations. The South China Sea Conflict has been ongoing since at least 1909, when the Qing sent a German-guided ship on a two-day voyage to the Paracels to fire cannon and claim the area. The two major adversaries -- China and the U.S. (plus allies), are in a long-term stalemate with incremental changes and frequent outbursts of brinkmanship. Occupation and economic activities in foreign exclusive economic zones (EEZs) increased substantially in the 1980s, and are the basis of a conflict that will likely persist for the next 10-20 years. Country-specific specialists are in discussion with one another between the covers of

*this book, in order to better understand the strategies of major players and their likely outcomes. One cannot understand the South China Sea dispute without understanding the interaction of grand strategies, and that requires consideration of military, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the conflict across all major powers. This book provides that comparative strategic analysis of the dispute that is required to make progress towards its solution.*

*China's Grand Strategy*

*Competing Discourses*

*Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Without a Grand Strategy*

*Forging An American Grand Strategy*

*The Absence of Grand Strategy*

*Comparative Grand Strategy*

*The Grand Strategy that Won the Cold War*

***Emergent Strategy and Grand Strategy thus offers both scholars and practitioners of foreign policy an original theoretical framework to explain strategic success.***

***Discover how rivalling discourses of American grand strategy reveal a fractured consensus of geopolitical identity and national security under President Obama. This conflict manifested in divergent elite visions of liberal hegemony, cooperative engagement and unilateral restraint. Georg Lfflmann examines the identity conflict within the Washington foreign policy establishment, between elite insiders and outsiders, and how the 'Obama Doctrine' both confirmed a geopolitical vision of American exceptionalism and challenged established notions of US hegemony and world leadership.***

***The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America's consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including***

*sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.*

*What is grand strategy and what is it good for? What are great powers, and which states are great powers today? What are the grand strategies available to great powers? What are the conditions under which a certain strategy is suitable and when should it be rejected? What are the factors affecting the success or failure of a given grand strategy? The present volume provides answers to these questions by introducing a typology of great power grand strategies, as strategies of rising, status quo, and declining powers, as well as through historical illustrations of each type. The reader is thus exposed to strategies such as divide and conquer, biding your time, opportunity strike, primacy, semi-detachment, concert, and appeasement through the experiences of leaders such as Bismarck, Peter the Great, Metternich, Deng Xiaoping, Neville Chamberlain, and Stalin. This analysis is then brought to bear on present developments in the grand strategies of the United States, China, and Russia. The volume should be of interest to both the academic and foreign policy-making communities, and in particular to students of international relations, diplomacy, history, and current international affairs.*

*Courting Failure*

*Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*

*US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century*

*The New Game in the South China Sea*

*Toward a New Grand Strategy*

*Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice*

*A Framework and Cases*

The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy addresses the conceptual and historical foundations, production, evolution, and future of grand strategy from a wide range of standpoints.

American foreign policy is the subject of extensive debate. Many look to domestic factors as the driving forces of bad policies. Benjamin Miller instead seeks to account for changes in US international strategy by developing a theory of grand strategy that captures the key security approaches available to US decision-makers in times of war and peace. Grand Strategy from Truman to Trump makes a crucial contribution to our understanding of competing grand strategies that accounts for objectives and means of security policy. Miller puts forward a model that is widely applicable, based on empirical evidence from post-WWII to today, and shows that external factors—rather than internal concerns—are the most determinative.

From the earliest days of the Republic, the outlines of an evolving American grand strategy have been evident in our foreign and domestic policy.<sup>1</sup> Much of that history continues to inform our strategic conduct, and therefore American grand strategy rests today on traditional foundations. Despite a welter of theory and debate, grand strategy as a practical matter is remarkably consistent from decade to decade, with its means altering as technology advances and institutions evolve but its ends and ways showing marked continuity. Grand strategy can be understood simply as the use of power to secure the state.<sup>2</sup> Thus, it exists at a level above particular strategies intended to secure particular ends and above the use of military power alone to achieve political objectives. One way to comprehend grand strategy is to look for long-term state behavior as defined by enduring, core security interests and how the state secures and advances them over time.

As new presidential administrations come into power, they each bring their own approach to foreign policy. No grand strategy, however, is going to be completely novel. New administrations never start with a blank slate, so it is always possible to see similarities between an administration and its predecessors. Conversely, since each administration faces novel problems and operates in a unique context, no foreign policy strategy is going to be an exact replica of its predecessors. In *American Pendulum*, Christopher Hemmer examines America's grand strategic choices between 1914 and 2014 using four recurring debates in American foreign policy as lenses. First, how should the United States balance the trade-offs between working alone versus working with other states and international organizations? Second, what is the proper place of American values in foreign policy? Third, where does the strategic perimeter of the United States lie? And fourth, is time on the side of the United States or of its enemies? Offering new readings of debates within the Wilson, Truman, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations, Hemmer asserts that heated debates, disagreements, and even confusions over U.S. grand strategy are not only normal but also beneficial. He challenges the claim that uncertainties or inconsistencies about the nation's role in the world or approach to security issues betray strategic confusion or the absence of a grand strategy. American foreign policy, he states, is most in danger not when debates are at their most pointed but when the weight of opinion crushes dissent. As the United States looks ahead to an increasingly multipolar world with increasing complicated security issues, Hemmer concludes, developing an effective grand strategy requires ongoing contestation and compromises between competing visions and policies.

**The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought**  
**Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror**  
**Grand Strategy from Truman to Trump**  
**The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy**  
**Explaining Foreign Policy**

**American Grand Strategy under Obama**

China's continuing rapid economic growth and expanding involvement in global affairs pose major implications for the power structure of the international system. To more accurately and fully assess the significance of China's emergence for the United States and the global community, it is necessary to gain a more complete understanding of Chinese security thought and behavior. This study addresses such questions as: What are China's most fundamental national security objectives? How has the Chinese state employed force and diplomacy in the pursuit of these objectives over the centuries? What security strategy does China pursue today and how will it evolve in the future? The study asserts that Chinese history, the behavior of earlier rising powers, and the basic structure and logic of international power relations all suggest that, although a strong China will likely become more assertive globally, this possibility is unlikely to emerge before 2015-2020 at the earliest. To handle this situation, the study argues that the United States should adopt a policy of realistic engagement with China that combines efforts to pursue cooperation whenever possible; to prevent, if necessary, the acquisition by China of capabilities that would threaten America's core national security interests; and to remain prepared to cope with the consequences of a more assertive China.

This book challenges the dominant strategic culture and makes the case for restraint in US grand strategy in the 21st century. Grand strategy, meaning a state's theory about how it can achieve national security for itself, is elusive. That is particularly true in the United States, where the division of federal power and the lack of direct security threats limit consensus about how to manage danger. This book seeks to spur more vigorous debate on US grand strategy. To do so, the first half of the volume assembles the most

recent academic critiques of primacy, the dominant strategic perspective in the United States today. The contributors challenge the notion that US national security requires a massive military, huge defense spending, and frequent military intervention around the world. The second half of the volume makes the positive case for a more restrained foreign policy by excavating the historical roots of restraint in the United States and illustrating how restraint might work in practice in the Middle East and elsewhere. The volume concludes with assessments of the political viability of foreign policy restraint in the United States today. This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, grand strategy, national security, and International Relations in general.

This unique book examines grand strategy and the assistance such a strategy makes to the development and articulation of the National Security Strategy. This is the focus of much of the curriculum at all the war colleges within the Pentagon. What is the country's grand strategy? Do we need one? If one does not exist, then in a world of complexity and globalization, what is the context that we will use to make decisions in the absence of a grand strategy that guides? How can the Nation plan in a proactive sense to be ready for the future, let alone shape one, without such a framework? The papers presented at this conference represent a sampling of the diversity of opinions on this topic. We hope that it will give the reader some issues to consider. Chapter 1 - Introduction \* Chapter 2 - Grand Strategy \* Chapter 3 - Educating Strategists: Some Discomforting Contradictions \* Chapter 4 - Eight Myths about American Grand Strategy \* Chapter 5 - Department of Homeland Security Approach to Strategy \* Chapter 6 - Forging Grand Strategy: The President's Role \* Chapter 7 - Grand Strategy and Human Thinking \* Chapter 8 - Designing the U.S. President's Ability to Make Strategy \* Chapter 9 - The Need for Grand Strategy Development: Lessons from the Project on National Security Reform and Singapore \* Chapter 10 - Postscript For more than 2 decades, it has been evident to many that the United States needs a new framework for a grand strategy, especially since the "containment" strategy of George F. Kennan that shaped U.S. policy during the Cold War is no longer relevant. But, what kind of framework do we need? Most commonly, grand strategy is framed in the context of warfare, or at least conflict among nations. There have been

exceptions, and the focus of this symposium was not on warfare or preparation for war. Our intent was to promote a discussion about the elements of and prospect for a grand strategy for America. Over the millennia, grand strategies have evolved as the complexities of the known world grew. Rulers have created and executed grand strategies for their nations through modern times. It is possible that a 21st century grand strategy will be very different than past models since our understanding of the world has and will change our understanding of how complex systems, including nations, behave. The empowerment of individuals or small groups with new technologies and communication tools can extend beyond anything imagined outside the realm of science fiction. Other factors may come into play as well. Some would also argue that, in a democracy, it is not possible to attain the necessary consensus to craft and implement a national grand strategy in the absence of an existential threat. Recent political discourse lends some credence to that line of reasoning.

On November 8-9, 2011, the National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC, held a conference entitled "Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future," which I had the privilege of chairing. For more than 2 decades, I have been studying the mechanisms and methods we use as a nation to develop and conduct grand strategy. The conversation that began at that conference needs to be further developed and continued. More importantly, we, as a nation, need to explore together the path ahead and answer questions regarding how and why we struggle with grand strategies. If developed and executed with a systemic orientation, grand strategies could help us shape our future in an ever changing and complex world. This volume represents a compilation of some of the presentations given at the NDU conference. It also represents the great diversity of opinions regarding this subject. For more than 2 decades, it has been evident to many that the United States needs a new framework for a grand strategy, especially since the "containment" strategy of George F. Kennan that shaped U.S. policy during the Cold War is no longer relevant. But, what kind of framework do we need? Most commonly, grand strategy is framed in the context of warfare, or at least conflict among nations. There have been exceptions, and the focus of this symposium was not on warfare

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The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972--2005

American Pendulum

A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy

Literature, Statecraft, and World Order

Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy

Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy

US and UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001-2012

foreign policy are rippling across the globe, *The Absence of Grand Strategy* offers key insight into the nature and evolution of American foreign policy in the Gulf.

Thoroughly updated with a new preface and a chapter on the 2003 Iraq War, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, already widely used in courses, will continue to be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy, international relations, and related fields.

"Ionut Popescu explores how successful American grand strategy comes about. For most experts in the academic world of political science and in the Washington policymaking community, the answer lies in the design and implementation of a farsighted strategic plan or framework. The role of such a Grand Design is to guide the president's foreign policy actions and resource allocation decisions in the pursuit of specific long-term

objectives. The alternative to following a Grand Design is usually said to consist of ad-hoc, incoherent, and ultimately unsuccessful foreign policy decision-making. But what if successful grand strategies are sometimes formed through an emergent process of learning and adaptation, instead of being the product of strategic planning and farsighted designs? Popescu argues that the Emergent Strategy model, adapted from the business strategy literature, explains some of the traditional success stories and failures of American grand strategy better than the prevalent Grand Design model. These findings suggest the need to shift the focus of policymakers away from planning for long-term objectives and toward short- and medium-term incremental learning and adaptation. Based on this new theoretical understanding of successful grand strategy being formed by either Design or Emergent elements depending on the circumstances, the book also offers a framework to help policymakers and strategic planners choose the right model and tools based on the level of uncertainty they face in the external environment"--

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring—and so elusive—to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when “grand strategy” is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is. Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to “do” grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking—but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come. The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005

Grand Strategies

Strategic Pluralism and Subcultures  
Recurring Debates in U.S. Grand Strategy  
Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition  
How American Presidents Succeed in Foreign Policy  
Architecture of Triumph

"This research effort focuses on the causes [of an] astrategic approach by evaluating the absence of grand strategy at the national level, the resulting misalignment and distortion that has occurred in the defense policy, planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition processes, and the role DOD has played in fostering this strategic shortfall. The critique utilizes the expected fiscal austerity and complex threat environment of the next decade argue that the current unconstrained strategic approach is unsustainable. DOD must desist in its passive approach to strategy and, instead, drive the strategic development process, execute a genuine strategic review, foster a new value culture within the department that focuses on national loyalty and moral courage instead of parochialism and status quo, and advocate for a new roles and missions review for the Services and Defense Agencies."--Abstract.

This book accounts the Reagan administration's development and execution of the grand strategy that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasizing the coordinated use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. It challenges the dominant narrative that often denies the existence of the grand strategy.

As India prepares to take its place in shaping the course of an 'Asian century', there are increasing debates about its 'grand strategy' and its role in a future world order. This timely and topical book presents a range of historical and contemporary interpretations and case studies on the theme. Drawing upon rich and diverse narratives that have informed India's strategic discourse, security and foreign policy, it charts a new agenda for strategic thinking on postcolonial India from a non-Western perspective. Comprehensive and insightful, the work will prove indispensable to those in defence and strategic studies, foreign policy, political science, and modern Indian history. It will also interest policy-makers, think-tanks and diplomats.

In strategic studies and international relations, grand strategy is a frequently-invoked concept. Yet, despite its popularity, it is not well understood and it has many definitions, some of which are even mutually contradictory. This state of affairs undermines its usefulness for scholars and practitioners alike. Lukas Milevski aims to remedy this situation by offering a conceptual history of grand strategy in the English language, analysing its evolution from 1805 to the present day in the writings of its major proponents. In doing so, he seeks to clarify the meaning and role of the concept, both theoretically and practically, and shed light on its continuing utility today.

The Grand Strategies of Great Powers

Restraint

On Grand Strategy

U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars

India's Grand Strategy

History, Theory, Cases

Great Powers, Grand Strategies

Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror offers an in-depth analysis of US/UK military strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to the present day. It explores the development of contemporary military strategy in the West in the modern age before interrogating its application in the Global War on Terror. The book provides detailed insights into the formulation of military plans by political and military elites in the United States and United Kingdom for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Alastair Finlan highlights the challenges posed by each of these unique theatres of operation, the nature of the diverse enemies faced by coalition forces, and the shortcomings in strategic thinking about these campaigns. This fresh perspective on strategy in the West and how it has been applied in recent military campaigns facilitates a deep understanding of how wars have been and will be fought. Including key terms, concepts and discussion questions for each chapter, Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror is a crucial text in strategic studies, and required reading for anyone interested in the new realities of transnational terrorism and twenty-first century warfare.

David C. Kang tells an often overlooked story about East Asia's 'comprehensive security', arguing that American policy towards Asia should be based on economic and diplomatic initiatives rather than military strength.

The United States today is the most powerful nation in the world, perhaps even stronger than Rome was during its heyday. It is likely to remain the world's preeminent power for at least several decades to come. What behavior is appropriate for such a powerful state? To answer this question, Robert J. Art concentrates on "grand strategy"-the deployment of military power in both peace and war to support foreign policy goals. He first defines America's contemporary national interests and the specific threats they face, then identifies seven grand strategies that the United States might contemplate, examining each in relation to America's interests. The seven are: •dominion-forcibly trying to remake the world in America's own image; • global collective security-attempting to keep the peace everywhere; •regional collective security-confining peacekeeping efforts to Europe; • cooperative security-seeking to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting other states' offensive capabilities; • isolationism-withdrawing from all military involvement beyond U.S. borders; •containment-holding the line against aggressor states; and •selective engagement-choosing to prevent or to become involved only in those conflicts that pose a threat to the country's long-term interests. Art makes a strong case for selective engagement as the most desirable strategy for contemporary America. It is the one that seeks to forestall dangers, not simply react to them; that is politically viable, at home and abroad; and that protects all U.S. interests, both essential and desirable. Art concludes that "selective engagement is not a strategy for all times, but it is the best grand strategy for these times."

"In recent years, historians and other scholars have offered useful definitions, most of which coalesce around the notion that grand strategy is an amplification of the "normal" strategic practice of deploying various means to attain specific ends. "The crux of grand strategy," writes Paul Kennedy, co-founder of the influential Grand Strategy program at Yale University, "lies...in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests." John Lewis Gaddis, the program's co-founder with Kennedy, defines grand strategy succinctly as "the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities."

Hal Brands, an alumnus of Yale's program and a contributor to this volume, observes that grand strategy is best understood as an "intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy; it is the logic that helps states navigate a complex and dangerous world." Peter Feaver, who followed Yale's model when establishing a grand strategy program at Duke University, is somewhat more specific: "Grand strategy refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest." International Relations theorist Stephen Walt is even more precise: "a state's grand strategy is its plan for making itself secure. Grand strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal. Strategy is thus a set of 'contingent predictions': if we do A, B, and C, the desired results X, Y, and Z should follow."--

Rethinking American Grand Strategy

India's Grand Strategy and Foreign Policy

Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy

The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy

What Good Is Grand Strategy?

Securing a Path Through a Complex Future

*All efforts presently underway in the United States Government (USG) to plan, organize, and resource for future stabilization and reconstruction operations are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy. The Department of State and the Department of Defense, in coordination with several other departments and agencies of the USG, several more intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and allies and friends, are ambitiously attempting to build new capacities and institutionalize new processes that will better enable the USG and its like-minded partners to conduct political interventions into fragile, failing, failed, and post-conflict states in order to rebuild those states' institutions of civil governance. All of these efforts are handicapped by the absence of a grand strategy that links them with - and links together - the array of adjacent USG plans to, among other things, align diplomacy and development assistance, secure and defend the U.S. homeland, combat terrorism, cooperate with theater security partners, counter the proliferation of weapons mass destruction, and conduct major combat operations to win decisively and achieve enduring results. Not only should the USG plans be linked, but also the participation with the USG in these and similar operations of allies & partners and intergovernmental & nongovernmental organizations needs to be addressed with sufficient specificity to guide investment in U.S. capacity as a measurable subset of global capacity. Absent grand strategy, which presumably accomplishes the above and more, planning and resourcing for stabilization and reconstruction operations amounts to pre-planning responses to anticipated crises on a case-by-case basis.*

*A master class in strategic thinking, distilled from the legendary program the author has co-taught at Yale for decades For almost two decades, Yale students have competed for admission each year to the "Studies in Grand Strategy" seminar taught by John Lewis Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charles Hill. Its purpose has been to prepare future leaders for responsibilities they will face, through lessons drawn from history and the classics. Now Gaddis has distilled that teaching into a succinct, sharp and potentially transformational book, surveying statecraft from the*

*ancient Greeks to Franklin D. Roosevelt and beyond. An unforgettable guide to the art of leadership, On Grand Strategy is, in every way, its own master class.*